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I want you to connect with my clients.
My clients are the dispossessed of this world, those people out 
there right now who have lost everything what matters.  I deal 
with people who have lost dignity. I deal with people who have 
lost their homes.
I deal with people that have been fleeing from the failure of 
systems, the failure of politics the failure of diplomacy, the 
failure of climate policies, the failure of all of us actually to 
take care of ourselves. I deal with people who are the victim of 
intolerance, and there are hundreds and hundreds of millions 
of victims out there, somewhere.
I am working for the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, for the last almost 25 years. I’m one of these crisis 
manager, I’m the one - you can see me on tv - who is standing 
somewhere at the border and saying with very serious talk: 
“Here’s the situation we have to take care of, here are hundred 
thousand refugees coming across the border, the situation 
is very serious, we have to provide food, water”, there are 
horrible stories coming out and so on. That’s my world and 
as I speak there are thousands like me right now providing 
assistance somewhere in Central Africa Republic, somewhere 
in Southern Sudan, somewhere in Congo, somewhere all over 
the world.
Tens of thousands people who try to help the others to at least 
connect with one thing: survival. Is that good enough?  Is 
what we are doing today in the 21st century in just providing 
water, food , shelter, a bit of health, is all that good enough for 
millions and hundreds of millions of people out there? I don’t 
think so.
I’ve been working all over the world but right now I’m 
managing the largest refugee camp for Syrian refugee in the 
world. I’m managing right now the camp of Za’atari. There 
are hundred thousand of people there, out of two millions who 
have fled one of the most brutal wars of this world wich we 
have not managed to stop, none of us have managed to stop. 
There are more than six millions, probably seven millions 
people displaced within Syria, there are millions of people who 
cannot even flee because they are surrounded by militians, so I 
manage just the tip of the iceberg.
When I came out of Mogadishu, a bit more than a year ago, 
I was told: “you go there”. I really didn’t understand why, 
because what I knew was that that crisis was ongoing, was 
horrible, was terrible, but we had money compared to other 
situations. We had teams, the logistic is easy. That monster 
is one and a half hours from Amman on the highway, easy 
logistics, is not somewhere in the deepest forest, somewhere in 
the Central African Republic. It’s possible to get there, there is 
no problem.
I knew that we had managed for once - because it is very 
rare a humanitarian response to provide the right things 
in time, because it’s so complicated, because we don’t have 
money - to get enough water, enough food, every single shelter 
required, all the health systems, everything into place in time. 
Everybody in there has not missed one day of food, one day 
without health assistance. Nobody died in there without a very 
serious reason, because we were there and we responded.
However why did they send somebody like me, who has been 
managing big things, the biggest operations in the world at 
times, there? Because something was wrong. These people in 
here were attacking aid workers every day. Everyday violent 
demonstrations, stone throwing. I found on site staff members 
scared to go into the camp because of the attack, they were 
aggressed. I have up to four, five staff members  injured every 
week ending up in hospital. We had one Jordanian policeman 
killed, we had twelve others brutally assaulted and one of them 
almost killed. So something was wrong in there.
What is wrong if you provide everything according to your 
standards? We have worked for decades in the humanitarian 
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world to define field standards, we have tried to standardize 
things. Why that was not enough to put peace into these 
people?
What we have not realized was they’re people. They’re simply 
human beings, and they’re all different.
Here we have a hundred thousand people that have lost by 
force everything, and so that is what we have to keep in mind, 
there are hundred thousand stories that are behind this I have 
to realize all the time. So we cannot with all our standards, 
with all the beauty of organizing everything very well,  forget 
they are people.
We started to understand that a place like this camp is an 
ideal field for people who try to seize the opportunities of 
fast urbanization. These are all people who have been living 
in small villages, somewhere back in southern Syria, so they 
are not used to live together in large numbers. This provides 
opportunities for bad people to come up, bad leadership to rise. 
So we have in here, a whole group of people who seized the 
opportunity – mafia if you want to call it like this - of buying 
and selling relief items, of organizing the theft of electricity. 
We put the street lights so that the women can go to the toilet 
at night, but we hadn’t thought that people just needed to 
connect two wires to get electricity in their homes. Somebody 
has organized to steal electricity from these street lights to 
have power in the tents, on in the containers. There are 350 
electricians working in that camp and they are all organized, 
you have to put forward an application to that group of 
electricians to get your connection done. So now UNHCR is 
paying every month is 500 thousand euros, out of which about 
400 thousand euros for stolen electricity. We also had people 
who thought that public buildings would be better privatized, 
so we have had over sixty buildings disappearing.  Public 
toilets made private toilets. So there are homes with electricity 
connections, a tv, a private toilet, but all of this doesn’t match 
with our planning, with our thinking.
So what actually happened is that besides bad influence, bad 
leadership, people showed us that they had a different concept 
of the space, a different concept of how that settlement should 
look like.
We were building a camp, they were building a city.
We were building a storage facility for people, they were 
actually developing a living space: an organic living space 
with all the good things and the bad things which happen.
So our standards do not seem to be adequate for people who 
see the space and their services completely in a different way. 
There many people working at the camp, does anybody have 
a clue about cities? No. We are all experts in humanitarian 
assistance. So what we have done is we brought in expertise 
which we don’t have in our staff. 
Another aspect is food aid. Food aid is very undignifying, so 
what has the UN World Food Programme done is setting up 
two supermarkets and sixteen shops, where people can go with 
your voucher and do their shopping.
So what we’re trying to create there is building out a system. 
Because we have people who offer everyday something and we 
understood we have to structure this. It’s not about charity, 
it’s about bringing global resources to a place like this one 
and use the best experience and practice to have transfer 
of technologies and ideas. We have to create a system more 
organic and more people driven to invest the simple site plan 
which has nothing to do with the reality.  We have to structure 
this, we have to have somewhere in the middle of the ground 
what we call the front office. We have to have people who have 
the time and the capacity to bring this resources together 
on the ground and to make sure that there is a connectivity 
between the real need on the ground with what is in fact out 
there in the world.
And here comes from me the last message to you: it is not 
because you are a displaced that you cannot contribute to your 
own country, to the world, to wherever you live. You have a 
contribution to make. 21st century means that all people in the 
world deserve to land in the 21st century and we can make it 
happen together.
(Kilian Kleinschmidt, “Global Resource Networking”, in TEDxHamburg 
Urban Connectors, Amburgo, 1 aprile 2014.)
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9gono da tempo e che ancora non hanno trovato risoluzione.
In terzo luogo, i campi profughi si sono resi tristemente noti 
per le loro condizioni di vita al limite dell’umanità, sollevan-
do spesso l’indignazione dell’opinione pubblica. Progettare 
l’intervento su tali contesti, o anche solo porre la questione 
del loro sviluppo a lungo termine, porterebbe all’attenzione 
dell’opinione pubblica l’ipocrisia dietro la temporaneità di 
tali luoghi, e potrebbe stimolare la comunità internazionale 
a prendere posizioni più risolute per la soluzione della crisi.
Le difficoltà di intervenire in tali contesti sono, come si vedrà, 
molteplici. Le più determinanti sono di natura politica, e per 
questo difficili da sradicare. Esse riguardano interessi econo-
mici e dinamiche geopolitiche che potrebbero non essere mai 
superati. L’altra difficoltà, di natura più sociologica, è evidente 
ma spesso sottovalutata: i campi profughi sono gli unici casi 
al mondo di strutture urbane dove le persone vivono contro 
la propria volontà. In questo senso, non è sorprendente che 
siano stati assimilati ai campi di concentramento nazisti, e 
che molti studiosi del diritto si pongano domande sulla loro 
legittimità.
D’altra parte, le potenzialità di intervento sembrano superare 
queste limitazioni. Le popolazioni insediate nei campi profu-
ghi, nonostante le perdite umane e materiali e la lontananza 
da casa, mostrano incredibili capacità di adattamento e svi-
Contrariamente a quanto si possa percepire dai mezzi di in-
formazione, i profughi attualmente ospitati in campi sono 
solo una piccola parte di quelli totali. Nel 2015 l’UNHCR ha 
dichiarato di offrire protezione a 15,1 milioni di profughi,1 di 
cui 4,1 siriani. Di questi ultimi, solo il 10% risiede attualmente 
in campi,2 mentre il resto è distribuita in contesti urbani o ru-
rali nelle varie nazioni ospitanti. Inoltre, le condizioni dei pro-
fughi al di fuori dei campi (i cosiddetti urban refugees) sono 
spesso peggiori, poiché essi devono fronteggiare condizioni 
economiche non agevolate, difficoltà burocratiche e diffiden-
za delle comunità locali.
Fatta questa premessa, le motivazioni per studiare un cam-
po profughi sono essenzialmente tre. In primo luogo, essi 
sono gli unici contesti dove un mirato intervento può non 
solo risolvere problemi, ma anche avviare processi benefici 
di rigenerazione e di miglioramento della vita dei profughi in-
tesi come collettività. Fuori dai campi, dove i profughi sono 
distribuiti in più località, strategie applicate a macchia di le-
opardo (costruzione di case, scuole, infrastrutture) sarebbe-
ro certamente utili ad arginare i problemi, ma difficilmente 
riuscirebbero ad avere funzione di miglioramento collettivo. 
In secondo luogo, sviluppare un modello di intervento larga-
mente applicabile risulterebbe utile per risolvere i problemi di 
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1  UNHCR, Mid-Year Trends 2015, UNHCR, 2015. È da notare 
tuttavia che i profughi palestinesi, stimati intorno ai 5,1 
milioni nel 2014, sono gestiti da un’agenzia separata, 
l’UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East). Cfr. UNHCR, Global 
Trends. Forced Displacement in 2014, UNHCR, 2014.
2  UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal, http://data.unhcr.org/
syrianrefugees/regional.php
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luppo personale. Se tali capacità fossero potenziate, il cam-
po potrebbe funzionare come rifugio attivo, dando modo agli 
abitanti di preparare il ritorno e la ricostruzione delle proprie 
vite e città. Inoltre, gli stati ospitanti potrebbero beneficiare 
dall’operosità di coloro cui offrono rifugio, se solo superas-
sero la diffidenza e offrissero loro una possibilità di sviluppo.
Il Caso di Studio
Il campo profughi di Za’atari, situato al confine tra Siria e 
Giordania, è attivo da luglio 2012 e ospita attualmente circa 
80.000 rifugiati siriani, provenienti prevalentemente dal Go-
vernatorato di Daraa nella Siria Meridionale. La guerra civile 
siriana ha prodotto una delle maggiori crisi umanitarie degli 
ultimi decenni, causando la sfollamento di oltre 11 milioni di 
persone, di cui oltre 4 ufficialmente rifugiati in paesi esteri. 
Za’atari è rappresentativo del principale problema che affligge 
i campi profughi, identificabile nella contraddizione tra la loro 
dichiarata temporaneità e l’effettiva durata della loro vita, che 
copre spesso intere generazioni.
Insediamenti realizzati in brevissimo tempo e con soluzioni 
di emergenza, con gli anni i campi profughi si dimostrano 
costose e inefficienti macchine urbane, insostenibili per gli 
abitanti e dannose per l’ambiente. Inoltre, la mancata consi-
derazione degli aspetti socioculturali delle popolazioni inse-
diate genera strutture urbane incapaci di soddisfare i bisogni 
dei propri abitanti.
Come Za’atari insegna, i profughi reagiscono a questa situa-
zione modificando il campo stesso e le sue strutture, dando 
vita a un processo di adattamento che causa tensioni e costi 
aggiuntivi per le organizzazioni umanitarie.
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